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I.

INTRODUCTION

State constitutions, long overlooked by law schools, litigants,
and judges as a source of protection for individual rights and
liberties, are slowly and steadily coming into focus in the 1990s.
In all fifty states,judges are being asked to interpret obscure provisions in state constitutions and to articulate standards that vary
in application from the familiar federal constitutional models.
While the intense and comprehensive focus on state constitutions as an important new source of individual rights is relatively
recent, the die has been cast for nearly two decades. A sharp
retreat from broad standards that had only recently been articulated by the Warren Court, vigorous encouragement from Justice William 0. Brennan, 1 and the work of pioneering state court
justices have combined to bring state constitutions back from the
shadows.
The Minnesota judiciary is reacting to these developments in
much the same manner as its colleagues in other jurisdictions.
In some areas, the courts are blazing new trails, demonstrating a
resolute independence in using the Minnesota Constitution to
protect individual rights beyond the safeguards of the Federal
t Chief Deputy Attorney General, Minnesota Attorney Generals Office, St. Paul,
Minnesota. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Thomas
Levandowski and BrentJohnson with respect to their contributions to this article.
1. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 493 (1977).
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Bill of Rights. In other areas, the courts have been reluctant to
abandon the familiar, well-understood standards articulated by
the United States Supreme Court. Without question, however,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has delivered a clear and unmistakable message: The Minnesota Constitution is alive and well,
and the court will not hesitate to use the state's bill of rights to
articulate standards that are broader in application than their
federal counterparts. In many instances, that proclamation is
simply a promise and nothing more. But for litigants, it means
that the path ahead has grown ever more hazy, a journey with
many possible destinations.
The Minnesota Constitution's version of the bill of rights appears in article I and contains provisions that are textually identical or at least strikingly similar to provisions in the Bill of Rights
in the United States Constitution. At the same time, it represents unfamiliar guarantees that have not been interpreted. Are
these obscure passages an awakening giant, poised to change
our lives and diminish significantly the role of the Federal Constitution in our state? Or is our own bill of rights a temporary
source of protection that will be used only to "hold the line"
until the high court pendulum swings back to the left? How important are the well-established federal precedents in analyzing
the meaning of the often identical words in Minnesota's article
I? Is the Minnesota Constitution a newly-discovered document
of mischief, a "second bite at the apple" for those who disagree
with the political philosophies of United States Supreme Court
Justices? Or is the Minnesota Constitution a reflection of our
state's unique perspective about individual rights?
However one approaches these questions, one answer is clear:
The rebirth of state constitutional law has given states a remarkable opportunity to take a step back and examine how broadly
individual rights should be protected. In an era of increasingly
exclusive federal control over states, state constitutional protections are an important exception where, for the most part, state
supreme court decisions are the final word. As a result, the
reemergence of state constitutions presents the State of Minnesota with opportunities to interpret its constitution in a manner
that truly reflects the unique values and interests of Minnesotans. Herein lies the greatest value of a state constitutionits ability to react to unique local concerns and conditions.
This article briefly surveys and analyzes developments under
the Minnesota Constitution in six areas of importance to the
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss2/8
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criminal justice system: the double jeopardy clause, the right to
counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the right to an impartial jury trial, the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the right to confront a witness.2 All of these
clauses of the Minnesota Constitution contain language substantially similar to language in the United States Constitution.
II.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The United States Supreme Court has described the guarantee against double jeopardy as "deeply ingrained in . . . the Anand "clearly
glo-American system of jurisprudence,"'
'fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice.' "I The underlying principle of the double jeopardy guarantee balances the
prejudice to a defendant from multiple prosecutions brought by
the state with its many resources 5 against the government's inter2. This article does not survey criminal constitutional developments under the
Minnesota Constitution with respect to due process rights. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has frequently stated that the protections afforded under the due process clauses
of the federal and state constitutions are the same. See, e.g., Sartori v. Harnischfeger
Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988); Guilliams v. Commissioner of Revenue, 299
N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. 1980); Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 190, 32
N.W.2d 538, 541 (1948).
Recently, however, in State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1992), the Minnesota Supreme Court hinted that the due process protections in the federal and state
constitutions may be different. "As for due process, we need not decide in this case
whether more process is due under the Minnesota Constitution than under the federal
Constitution." Id. at 56.
3. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (quoting Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
4. Id. at 796 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). The Benton
t]
Court also stated that "[ he fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted." Id. at 795.
5. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Doublejeopardy primarily
focuses on the threat of multiple prosecutions. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
336 (1975). See also State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. 1985) (Wahl,J., dissenting) ("The protective doctrine of doublejeopardy is nothing more than the declaration
of an ancient and well established public policy that no man should be unduly harassed
by the state's being permitted to try him for the same offense again and again until the
desired result is achieved.") (quoting State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62, 62 N.W.2d
512, 516 (1954)).
Double jeopardy protection, at its core, "prevents the State from honing its trial
strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction. Repeated prosecutorial sallies would unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of
conviction through sheer governmental perseverance." Clewis v. State, No. 05-92
01950-CR, 1994 WL 76471, at *7 (Tex. C. App. Mar. 8, 1994), petition for review filed
(Apr. 28, 1994).
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est in receiving one fair opportunity to convict the defendant. 6
Double jeopardy generally limits a defendant to one punishment
or prosecution for a single criminal offense, determined on the
merits, usually by conviction or acquittal.7
From very early on, Minnesota recognized the plea of double
jeopardy as an established fundamental right grounded in the
common law and safeguarded by state constitutional law.8 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that "[t] he protective doctrine of double jeopardy is nothing more than the declaration of
an ancient and well-established public policy that no man should
be unduly harassed by the state's being permitted to try him for
the same offense again and again until the desired result is
achieved."9 The double jeopardy bar guarantees that a defendant will experience the "great psychological, physical and financial burdens" of a criminal trial only once "for the same
offense."'"
The United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution both prohibit putting individuals twice in jeopardy for the
same offense. The double jeopardy provision in the Minnesota
Constitution closely tracks its federal counterpart. The Minnesota double jeopardy provision in article 1, section 7 provides
that "no person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense."" The Fifth Amendment to the United States

6. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1978). The public values "fair
trials designed to end in just judgments." Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
See generallyJames F. Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be Irrelevant:Government Overreachingas
a Bar to Reprosecution Under the DoubleJeapardy Clause After Oregon v. Kennedy, 69 CORNELL
L. Rav. 76, 80-81 (1983) (discussing policies underlying the double jeopardy bar, as
applied to prosecutorial misconduct); Michael J. Klarman, Mistrials Arising From
ProsecutorialError: DoubleJeopardyProtection, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1061, 1062-65 (1982) (discussing the competing interests of the defendant and the state in a trial).
7. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978). Double jeopardy, however, does not bar reprosecution of a defendant whose conviction is overturned on
appeal. Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 373 S.E.2d 328, 332 (Va. 1988), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 911 (1990). This exception to double jeopardy does not apply where reversal is
required because of insufficient evidence. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18
(1978).
8. See State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 47, 273 N.W. 353, 355 (1937).
9. State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62, 62 N.W.2d 512, 516 (1954).
10. State v. Kjeldahl, 278 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1979) (quoting Breed v. Jones, 421
U.S. 519, 519 (1976)).
11. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss2/8
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Constitution similarly provides that no person shall "be subject
12
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
In Oregon v. Kennedy,"3 the Supreme Court articulated the rule
for determining when prosecutorial misconduct is the basis for a
federal double jeopardy claim. 1 4 The Court held that Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy prevents retrial only when the government intended to "goad" the defendant into requesting a
mistrial.' 5 The defendant in Kennedy, who faced theft charges in
state court, successfully moved for a mistrial after the prosecution characterized the defendant as a "crook" during redirect examination of the prosecution's expert witness.1 6 The state
appellate court barred retrial on the theft charges on double
jeopardy grounds. 7
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal double
jeopardy protection based on prosecutorial misconduct is triggered only by intentional misconduct undertaken to compel the
defendant to request a mistrial. 8 Prosecutorial negligence or
harassment not specifically intended to cause a mistrial was insufficient to bar retrial. 9 The Court found that the prosecu12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court, in Benton v. Mayland, 395 U.S.
784, 794 (1969), made the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment binding on
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
13. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
14. Id. at 675-76. For a general review of how states are using their own constitutions to afford greater double jeopardy protections than the federal courts in cases of
prosecutorial misconduct, see generally BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 145-52 (1991). State constitutional double jeopardy protections also arise
for a variety of other reasons, including: successive prosecutions by a single jurisdiction,
multiple punishments for the same offense in a single trial, and consecutive trials
against the same defendant by state and federal courts (the "dual sovereignty" doctrine). Id.
15. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676. Prosecutorial intent, according to the Court, is to be
inferred from objective facts. Id. at 675. Kennedy narrowed the federal double jeopardy
protection previously afforded under United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976). Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 677-79. In Dinitz, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Double
Jeopardy Clause barred retrial where prosecutorial bad faith conduct threatened harassment of a defendant by multiple prosecutions, or where prosecutorial conduct was specifically intended to give the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict the
defendant. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611. The Court in Kennedy expressly refined Dinitz by
removing prosecutorial bad faith conduct and harassment as grounds for the double
jeopardy bar. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674-75. Kennedy concluded that this portion of the
Dinitz test afforded no standards for assessing prosecutorial error. Id. at 675.
16. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 669.
17. Id. at 670.
18. Id. at 676.
19. Id. at 674-76. According to the Court, "[pirosecutorial conduct that might be
viewed as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defend-
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tion's conduct was not intended to provoke the defendant into
moving for a mistrial and, thus, double jeopardy did not bar retrial.20 The Supreme Court indicated that the Kennedy intent
standard "is a narrow exception to the rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause is no bar to retrial."2 1
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct and its relationship to the double
jeopardy protection afforded under the Minnesota Constitution
in State v. Fuller.22 Fuller came to trial facing multiple misdemeanor charges, including driving after suspension of his license. 23 Before trial started, both parties stipulated that the
defendant's license was suspended at the time of the incident,
that the defendant knew of the suspension, and that other evidence regarding these facts was inadmissible. 24 The prosecution, however, elicited testimony from its witness concerning the
stipulated facts and the court granted the defendant's motion
for a mistrial.2" At the second trial the prosecution assured the
court that the witness understood what had caused the first mistrial and the court directly warned the prosecution not to inquire into the stipulated facts. 6 A second mistrial was granted
ant's motion, therefore, does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor
to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 675-76.
20. Id. at 679.
21. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982). The Kennedy decision is not without its critics. For instance, the Maryland Supreme Court has concluded that Kennedy requires an
exclusive focus on the intent of the prosecutor in committing the error and not on the
fact of prosecutorial error or on the impact of such error on a defendant. See Fields v.
State, 626 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Md. 1993).
The Kennedy Court also noted that when the defendant consents to a mistrial, or
when "manifest necessity" requires a mistrial over the defendant's objection, double
jeopardy does not bar retrial. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672. "Manifest necessity" is a determination within the trial court's discretion, such as when a mistrial is declared by a
judge following a lack of a verdict by a hungjury. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). In determining whether "manifest necessity"justifies a retrial,
courts must look at all circumstances and decide whether the ends of public justice
would be defeated by the double jeopardy bar. Id. See also State v. Stillday, 417 N.W.2d
728, 732-33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that manifest necessity for mistrial existed
where defense counsel presented version of facts he was not prepared to prove and jury
was irretrievably tainted by the defense counsel's line of questioning).
22. 374 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985).
23. Id. at 724. The charges stemmed from a single incident reported by a woman
who had lived with the defendant. The charges in the complaint were assault in the
fifth degree, criminal damage to property, and driving after suspension. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 724-25.
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when the2 7 prosecution again breached the impermissible
testimony.
Fuller's petition for a writ of prohibition to bar further prosecution on double jeopardy grounds was granted by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 28 The court acknowledged that under
Kennedy, Fifth Amendment double jeopardy was not implicated
because the prosecutor did not intentionally elicit the improper
testimony.2 9 The court of appeals, however, determined that
Minnesota's double jeopardy provision afforded broader protection than the federal double jeopardy protections defined in
Kennedy.3 ° According to the court, the Minnesota interpretation,
unlike the Kennedy intentional conduct standard, also covered
mistrials caused by prosecutorial gross negligence and bad
faith. 1 The court of appeals found that the prosecutor's failure
to adequately prepare his witness to avoid repeating the improper testimony met this threshold.3 2
In addition, the court focused on the harm suffered by Fuller,
noting that mistrials caused by the prosecution forced him to
appear, far from his home, for trial three times without receiving
a complete and fair trial.3" The court of appeals concluded that
Minnesota's double jeopardy bar applied when mistrials caused
by prosecutorial bad faith created economic hardship likely to
plead guilty to avoid further trial
make the defendant
34
appearances.
In effect, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected Kennedy's
narrowing of the federal double jeopardy protection in cases involving prosecutorial negligence." The court recognized that
Kennedy removed prosecutorial bad faith harassment and overreaching as grounds for a federal double jeopardy claim. 36 Nevertheless, Fuller proceeded to fashion the Minnesota double
27. Fuller,374 N.W.2d at 725.
28. State v. Fuller, 350 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
29. Id. at 385-86.
30. Id. at 386.
31. Id.
32. Id. Specifically, the court of appeals determined that the prosecutor's conduct
in eliciting the testimony was "gross negligence constituting bad faith." Id.
33. Fuller,350 N.W.2d at 386.
34. Id.
35. Id. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's previous double jeopardy standard
articulated in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976), see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
36. Fuller, 350 N.W.2d at 385.
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jeopardy bar to include instances in which mistrials resulted
from prosecutorial bad faith harassment.3 7
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that "[i] t
is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own
state constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights
than does the federal constitution," and that the court was "independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of [Minnesota]
citizens.""8 The court, however, did not believe that Fuller
presented an appropriate case to decide whether the Minnesota
Constitution's double jeopardy clause provided broader protection than its federal counterpart with respect to prosecutorial
39
misconduct.
The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that retrial of
Fuller would not offend the Minnesota double jeopardy clause
for several reasons. First, referring to Kennedy, the court noted
that a Supreme Court interpretation of a federal constitutional
provision textually identical to a Minnesota Constitutional provision was "of inherently persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force."4" Second, and more important, the court found
that the prosecutor was merely negligent, not grossly negligent as
37. Id. The court of appeals noted that in State v. Gwara, 311 Minn. 106, 247
N.W.2d 417 (1976), the Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed whether double jeopardy protection applies after a mistrial, stating:
Ifjeopardy attached and the declaration of mistrial was at defendant's request
or with his consent, then the rule is that the state may retry defendant unless
the mistrial was necessitated by bad-faith, intentional misconduct of the trial
court or the prosecutor purposely designed to prejudice defendant's chances
for an acquittal or to goad him into requesting a mistrial.
Fuller,350 N.W.2d at 385 (quoting Gwara, 311 Minn. at 108, 247 N.W.2d at 419)).
Gwara articulated a standard for applying double jeopardy to bar retrial following a
mistrial caused by prosecutorial misconduct that echoed the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976). Gwara, 311 Minn. at 108-09, 247
N.W.2d at 419.
38. State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) (quoting O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979)).
39. Id. at 727. In State v. Schroepfer, 416 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), the
court of appeals once again addressed a defendant's request for expansion of Minnesota's double jeopardy protection beyond the Kennedy standard. Id. at 493. The court
concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct did not meet the Kennedy intent standard,
and also failed to present facts more egregious than those presented in Fuller. Id. In
addition, the court stated that "[a]t some point, prosecutorial misconduct will exceed
the level found in Fuller. Then it will be time to determine what the appropriate double
jeopardy standard is under the Minnesota Constitution. This is not such a case." Id. at
493-94.
40. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 727.
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the court of appeals had found.4" Notably, the supreme court
did not completely reject the gross negligence standard employed by the court of appeals to construe the Minnesota double
jeopardy provision.4" Rather, the court indicated that these circumstances did not rise to the level of gross negligence.
In dissent, Justice Wahl urged the court to use the "independent protective force of state law," rather than federal standards,
to define the scope of Minnesota's constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.4 3 Buttressed by an earlier supreme
court decision, the dissent argued that the primary purpose of
Minnesota's double jeopardy bar is to protect a criminal defendant from a second trial on the same offense.4 4 The Kennedy intent standard inadequately furthers this purpose by focusing on
punishing or deterring intentional prosecutorial misconduct
rather than on the nature and extent of harm caused the defendant.4 5 In the dissent's view, the majority's reliance on Kennedy not only improperly focuses on prosecutorial misconduct,
but places on the defendant the impossible burden of proving
that the prosecutor acted with the subjective intent to cause a
mistrial instead of an intent simply to prejudice the defendant. 46
For Justice Wahl, the court's decision in Fuller virtually denies
41. Id. The court characterized the prosecutor's conduct as merely negligent because the prosecutor had warned the witness against referring to the inadmissible testimony in the retrial and, therefore, had no reason to expect that his question would lead
to the improper statement. The Court also noted that the defense counsel did not
object to the prosecutor's question, only to the answer given by the witness. Id.
42. Id. The court stated its adherence to the principle that "[s]tate courts are, and
should be, the first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist system."
Id. at 726.
43. Id. at 727 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 727 (citing State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62, 62 N.W.2d 512, 516
(Minn. 1954)). The Thompson court held that the Minnesota Constitution is intended
"to protect a defendant in a criminal case from a second trial for the same offense, not
to punish an official for intentional misconduct." Thompson, 241 Minn. at 62, 62
N.W.2d at 516.
45. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 727-29.
46. Id. at 729. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 393 (1992). The author argues:
Short of an outright admission by the prosecutor that his conscious purpose
was to provoke a mistrial, however, the prosecutor's motive would be almost
impossible to prove. Under the Kennedy standard, a prosecutor with a weak or
damaged case is encouraged to commit prejudicial conduct. If he gets away
with it, he has a better chance of winning. If the defendant objects, and succeeds in obtaining a mistrial, the prosecutor will be able to retry the defendant
with a better-prepared case unless the defendant is able to prove that the prosecutor committed the misconduct with the purpose of securing a mistrial.
Id. at 440 (footnote omitted).
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criminal defendants who are highly prejudiced by prosecutorial
misconduct the ability to obtain the double jeopardy remedy.4 7
Justice Wahl approved the "gross negligence constituting bad
faith" standard that the court of appeals had applied to determine that the Minnesota Constitution barred retrial after mistrial caused by prosecutorial misconduct.4 8 She found that
retrial under this standard was barred due to the prosecutor's
inadequate witness preparation and deliberate inquiry about the
49
improper testimony, in spite of the court's express warnings.
Justice Wahl also noted that the Oregon Supreme Court refused to apply the Supreme Court's intentional misconduct standard to the Oregon double jeopardy provision when it
considered Kennedy on remand.5 0 The Oregon Supreme Court,
relying on an Oregon provision identical to Minnesota's double
jeopardy provision, found that the purpose of the guarantee was
furthered by a recklessness standard it defined as knowing misconduct coupled with indifference toward the probable risk of
mistrial.5 1 The Oregon court concluded, however, that the
prosecutorial misconduct in the case before it did not bar a retrial.5 2 Applying the recklessness standard to the facts of Fuller,
Justice Wahl concluded that, by refusing to heed the court's order to refrain from asking about the subject of the inadmissible
testimony, the prosecutor demonstrated indifference to the prej53
udice caused the defendant.
Justice Wahl approved the Oregon Supreme Court's recklessness test as another reasonable alternative to the Kennedy intent
standard.5 4 In her view, this standard ensures that appropriate
defendants receive double jeopardy protection without requiring such defendants to prove that the intent to cause a mistrial
actually motivated the prosecutor.5 5 Justice Wahl also believed
that the recklessness standard sufficiently preserves the state's interest in the fair administration of justice.5 6
47. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 729.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1326 (Or. 1983)).
51. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1326 (Or. 1983). See generaUy LATZER, supra note
13, at 144-45.
52. Kennedy, 666 P.2d at 1327.
53. State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 729 (Minn. 1985).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Arizona and Pennsylvania, states with constitutional double
jeopardy provisions identical to Minnesota's provision,5 7 have
adopted more expansive double jeopardy protections than those
afforded under the federal standard in Kennedy.5 8 A small
number of other states, including Michigan,5 9 have shown signs
of moving in that direction.6°

57. CompareARiz. CONST. art. II, § 10 and PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 with MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 7.
58. See, e.g., Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261, 271 (Ariz. 1984) (acknowledging
that, although United States Supreme Court decisions have great weight in interpreting
state constitutional issues, state courts should not blindly follow federal precedent);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992) (holding that regardless of the
federal standard, certain prosecutorial misconduct implicates the double jeopardy provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution).
Most states do not rely on state constitutional provisions as independent grounds
for granting defendants more double jeopardy protection than that afforded by the
Constitution. Eleven states have adopted the federal Kennedy standard for interpretation of state constitutional double jeopardy protections implicated by prosecutorial misconduct. E.g., Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1075-76 (Del. 1987); State v. Hoke, 731
P.2d 1261, 1263 (Haw. 1987); People v. Ramirez, 500 N.E.2d 14, 16 (Ill. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1053 (1987); State v. Rademacher, 433 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Iowa 1988);
Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 868, 869 (Ky. 1983); State v. Chapman, 496 A.2d
297, 300 (Me. 1985); State ex rel. Forsyth v. District Court, 701 P.2d 1346, 1356 (Mont.
1985); State v. White, 369 S.E.2d 813, 815 (N.C. 1988); State v. Diaz, 521 A.2d 129, 133
(R.I. 1987); State v. Tucker, 728 S.W.2d 27, 31 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).
New Mexico's double jeopardy standard reflected the Kennedy tenets even before
Kennedy was decided. See State v. Day, 617 P.2d 142, 145 (N.M. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 860 (1980).
59. See, e.g., People v. Dawson, 427 N.W.2d 886, 897 (Mich. 1988) (holding that,
because the federal standard applied, there was no need to address whether the state
constitution afforded more protection in this case); see also infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., State v. Hopson, 778 P.2d 1014, 1019 (Wash. 1989). In this case, a
mistrial resulted after the prosecutor elicited improper testimony. Id. at 1015. The
Washington Supreme Court declined to bar a retrial under either the Oregon or federal double jeopardy standards. Id. at 1019. The court, however, expressly left open
whether the state double jeopardy provision provided broader protection than the federal standard. Id. "When a set of facts that would require different results under the
Oregon and federal analyses is before the court, we will determine the scope of [the
Washington constitution's double jeopardy clause]." Id.
See also Robinson v. Commonwealth, 439 S.E.2d 622 (Va. Ct. App. 1994). Here, the
dissent argued that the prosecutor's repeated improper conduct in the face of continued warnings from the trial judge barred retrial under the provision of the Virginia
Constitution. Id. at 626-28. The dissent found that the Oregon state double jeopardy
standard articulated in Kennedy-knowing misconduct coupled with indifference toward the probable risk of mistrial-"better protects the right to be free from multiple
trials when the record contains proof of [repeated] improper prosecutorial misconduct." Id. at 628.
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In Pool v. Superior Court,6 ' the Arizona Supreme Court rejected
Kennedy's focus on deterring intentional prosecutorial misconduct. Instead, the court, finding support in Arizona precedent,
stated that the purpose of Arizona's double jeopardy bar was to
protect a defendant's interest in avoiding multiple trials.6 2 The
Pool court held that Arizona's double jeopardy clause bars retrial
when: (1) mistrial is granted because of improper prosecutorial
conduct or actions; (2) such conduct does not merely constitute
"legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety,"
but as a whole constitutes "intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial," undertaken for
"any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial or reversal;" and (3) the conduct causes
prejudice to the defendant curable only by mistrial.6"
The court found that the prosecutor engaged in intentional
misconduct "with indifference, if not specific intent" to prejudice the defendant and avoid probable acquittal.6 4 The prosecutor had erred in fashioning the indictment and in severing the
defendant's trial from another defendant's trial.6" The defendant raised a defense made possible by the defect in the indictment.6 6 The prosecutor indicated in court that he would
"forestall" any acquittal by terminating the trial and beginning
again with a new indictment. 67 Most important, the court found
that the prosecutor's cross examination of the defendant was
egregiously improper and done with indifference or specific intent to "avoid the significant danger of acquittal which had
arisen, prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction no matter what
the danger of mistrial or reversal."6"
In Commonwealth v. Smith,69 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found that Pennsylvania's double jeopardy clause afforded
greater protection than the Federal Double Jeopardy Clause.70
The court held that the Pennsylvania clause prohibits retrial of a
defendant not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

677 P.2d 261 (Ariz. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 270.
Poo4 677 P.2d at 270.
Id.
Id. at 272.
615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992).
Id. at 325.
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to provoke a mistrial, but also when the prosecutor deliberately
engages in bad faith conduct to harass the defendant and
thereby deprive him or her of a fair trial.7 1
The Smith prosecutor attempted to convict the defendant of
murder by concealing material and potentially exculpatory evidence. 72 The prosecutor suppressed such evidence while arguing in favor of a death sentence and also attempted to discredit a
state trooper who testified about the existence of the exculpatory
evidence. 73 The court concluded that, although the prosecutor
did not intend to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial,
the prosecutor deliberately sought to subvert the truth-determining process and to secure a conviction against the defendant
through the tainted process.7 4 According to the court, such
prosecutorial misconduct violated "all principles of justice and
fairness embodied in the Pennsylvania Constitution's double
jeopardy clause. 75
The Smith court observed that Pennsylvania had historically
viewed its double jeopardy bar as coextensive with the federal
provision.7 6 Prior to Kennedy, Pennsylvania's double jeopardy
bar followed United States v. Dinitz77 and applied both to
prosecutorial misconduct intended to provoke a mistrial to secure a retrial and to prosecutorial conduct undertaken in bad
faith to harass and prejudice the defendant. 78 When Kennedy
71. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Rightley, 617 A.2d 1289 (Pa. 1992). In Rightley,
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, shortly after Smith was decided, observed that
"[b] ad faith conduct or harassment of defendant.., is not necessarily designed to seek
a second trial, but its effect may deprive a defendant of a fair trial, thereby warranting a
new trial." Id. at 1292.
The United States Supreme Court has proscribed this type of prosecutorial misconduct, noting that the prosecutor:
[M]ay prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about ajust
one.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The question for the Court is whether
the same result would undoubtedly have been reached without the misconduct. Id. at
89.
72. Smith, 615 A.2d at 323.
73. Id. at 324.
74. Id. at 325.
75. Id. at 324.
76. Id. at 325.
77. 424 U.S. 600 (1976). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Dinitz in Commonwealth v. Starks, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (Pa. 1982).
78. Smith, 615 A.2d at 324.
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redefined the federal standard, Pennsylvania initially followed
suit, content that Kennedy did not diminish a defendant's double
jeopardy rights.7 9 Smith, however, reintroduced the bad faith
harassment standard and signaled the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's discontent with what it saw as Kennedy's overly restrictive
standard.8" The court took advantage of its independent state
authority to redress a perceived weakness in the federal
standard.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in People v. Dawson,81 concluded that Michigan's double jeopardy clause primarily shields
individuals from prosecutorial harassment and confers broaderreaching protection than under the Kennedy standard.8 2 The
court observed that "[i]t is well recognized that state constitutions can provide greater protections than those afforded by the
United States Constitution."8 3 The court held that the defendant could not be retried because the prosecutor's questioning
constituted conduct that the prosecutor "knew [was] improper,
and that he [proceeded] with indifference, if not a specific intent
to create unfair prejudice."8 4 The Dawson court expressly
adopted the standard articulated by the Arizona Supreme Court
in Pool v. Superior Court.8 5
On appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, the State conceded that the prosecutor's conduct violated the Kennedy intent
standard and urged the court to reject the Pool standard.8 6 The
supreme court, on that basis, declined to extend the protections
under Michigan's double jeopardy bar beyond the federal protections under Kennedy.87 The Dawson court did not disapprove
of the lower court's adoption of the Pool standard on substantive
grounds, nor did it reject adoption of such a standard in the
future.8
Under the right circumstances, the Minnesota Supreme Court
could expand the protection of the Kennedy test. In fact, it seems
likely, given the views of Justice Wahl and the experiences of
79. Id. at 325.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
397 N.W.2d 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 282-84.
Id. at 281 (citation omitted).
Id. at 284.
Id..
People v. Dawson, 427 N.W.2d 886, 897 (Mich. 1988).
Id. at 897.

88. Id.
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other states with similar double jeopardy provisions, that the
court will expand the Minnesota double jeopardy bar to cover
the types of persistent prosecutorial misconduct found in Pool
and Smith. In those cases, the prosecutors did not seek to provoke a mistrial, but rather sought to convict the defendant by
deliberately prejudicing the defendant's right to a fair trial. The
"gross negligence constituting bad faith standard," accepted by
the court of appeals and Justice Wahl, could be augmented by
focusing on the harm to the defendant arising from a subverted
truth-determining process. 89 The court seems most likely to expand Minnesota's double jeopardy protections beyond the Kennedy standard where the objective facts demonstrate that a
prosecutor engaged not in a singular instance of improper conduct, but rather in persistent, harassing conduct that deprived a
defendant of a fair trial. The weakness of the federal standard is
most clearly highlighted when repeated prosecutorial misconduct, after warnings from the court, fails to trigger Kennedy
double jeopardy protection.90 State courts can fashion a broader

89. In Bennett Gershman's article The New Prosecutors, the author argues that
"prosecutorial misconduct that triggers a mistrial, when committed by the prosecutor
with a deliberate bad faith purpose to unfairly prejudice the defendant's right to a fair
trial, should be sufficient to allow the defendant to invoke double jeopardy to bar retrial." Gershman, supra note 53, at 440 (footnote omitted). Gershman reasons:
That the defendant has a "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal" is undisputed. When a prosecutor engages in misconduct that
taints the jury, the defendant faces a" 'Hobson's choice' between giving up his
first jury and continuing a trial tainted by prejudicial judicial or prosecutorial
error." If a defendant believes that he must sacrifice his chosen jury because it
has been irreparably tainted by "bad faith" prosecutorial misconduct, double
jeopardy protects the defendant against being forced to stand trial again and
thereby "afford[ing] the prosecutfor] a more favorable opportunity to convict."
Id. at 440 n.289 (citations omitted).
90. In Kennedy, the plurality decision indicated that when a defendant moves for a
mistrial, the defendant deliberately elects to forego a determination in front of the first
fact finder and thereby renounces the right to double jeopardy protection. Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982). The Court, however, set forth a narrow exception
to this rule in cases where the prosecutor intentionally goads the defendant into requesting a mistrial. In such circumstances, the defendant's "valued right to complete
his trial before the first jury would be a hollow shell if [such circumstances] were held to
prevent [invocation of the double jeopardy bar]." Id. at 673. However, there is a strong
argument that where the prosecutor engages in a pattern of harassing conduct that
deprives a defendant of a fair trial, a defense motion for a mistrial can hardly be
deemed a meaningful decision by the defendant to relinquish her right to a verdict by
the first fact finder chosen to hear her case. See Steven A. Reiss, ProsecutorialIntent in
ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1365, 1423 (1987).
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and definable double jeopardy standard that, unlike the Kennedy
test, addresses such conduct.91
Moreover, the narrow federal standard set forth in Kennedy
arose from a case where only one instance of prosecutorial misconduct constituted overreaching.9 2 Kennedy did not involve a
sequence of prosecutorial overreaching or repeated misconduct
after adverse rulings and warnings. Justice Powell, who cast the
deciding vote in Kennedy, emphasized in his concurring opinion
that a "court-in considering a double jeopardy motionshould rely primarily upon the objective facts and circumstances
of the particular case," and that the facts in Kennedy "would have
been a close case . . .if there had been substantial factual evi'9 3
dence of intent beyond the [one improper] question itself.
Similarly, many state cases that deny double jeopardy protection
are situations, like Kennedy, where prosecutors have engaged in a
94
single, unrepeated instance of misconduct.
91. The United States Supreme Court has expressly indicated that states have independent responsibility, as well as full and final authority, to determine standards governing state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454 n.4 (1976) (Brennan,J., dissenting); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 719 (1975).
One author observes that the Minnesota Supreme Court traditionally has analyzed
several factors in deciding whether to interpret a state constitutional provision differently than a comparable federal provision:
First, the court looks at whether textual similarities between the state and federal provisions reflect the framers' intention for similar interpretation. Second, the court looks at Minnesota's constitutional history for an appropriate
interpretation of a Minnesota constitutional provision. Third, the court determines whether existing state law helps to define the scope of the state constitutional provision. Fourth, the court considers whether matters of particular
state or local concern justify an independent interpretation. Finally, experimentation and a search for a 'better rule of law,' while susceptible to criticism
if used as the sole basis for independent interpretation, may properly be considered as a ground for independent interpretation.
See Ingrid Kane, No More Secrets: Proposed Minnesota State Due Process Requirement that Law
Enforcement Officers Electronically Record Custodial Interrogationand Confessions, 77 MINN. L.
REv. 983, 1002-03 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
92. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 680 (Powell, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
94. See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 829 P.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (finding
that the prosecutor's attempt to impeach the defendant during cross examination,
which violated the rules of evidence, warranted mistrial but did not bar retrial); State v.
Hamala, 834 P.2d 275, 277 (Haw. 1992) (finding that a statement elicited by the prosecutor regarding prior bad acts was improper and highly prejudicial, justifying reversal,
but not barring retrial); Wheat v. State, 599 So. 2d 963, 965 (Miss. 1992) (finding that
the district attorney's impermissible closing argument in a murder case required reversal, but did not bar retrial).
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COUNSEL

The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is a fundamental right made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 5 An accused defendant's need for counsel was el96
oquently articulated by Justice Sutherland in Powell v.Alabama:
The right to be heard would be in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of the law.
... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. 97
The language recognizing the right to assistance of counsel in
the Minnesota Constitution is virtually identical to the text of the
Federal Constitution. Article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution requires that "[i] n all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel in his
defense.""8 The United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 9 As early as
1887, the Minnesota Legislature provided a right to the assistance of counsel for persons "restrained of liberty."'0 ° The mod95. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
96. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
97. Id. at 68-69.
98. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
99. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
100. The Minnesota General statute provided:
That all public officers ... having in custody any person ... restrained of his
liberty for any alleged cause whatever, shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, admit any practicing attorney at law who may have been retained by or in behalf of such person so restrained of his liberty, or whom such
person may desire to see or consult, to see such person and consult with him
alone and in private, at the jail or other place of custody.
1887 MINN. LAws ch. 187, § 1. The statute further provided:
That all public officers or other persons having in custody any person arrested
...or restrained of his liberty for any alleged cause whatever, shall, upon
being requested so to do by such person so restrained of his liberty, and
before other proceedings shall be had, and as soon as practicable after such
request is made, notify a practicing attorney at law.., that such person desires
to see and consult with the attorney so notified.
1887 MINN. LAws ch. 187, § 2.
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ern version
of that early statute reflects its original intent and
10 1
form.
Since the inception of the right, the issue of when the right to
counsel attaches has been vigorously debated in both state and
federal courts.' 0 2 Historically, Minnesota has been characterized
as "rather sympathetic to the plight of the indigent criminal defendant."1 0 3 By the early 1960s, the right to counsel in Minnesota attached earlier in the criminal process and continued later
in the process than in the federal system. 10 4 For example, in
Minnesota, indigent defendants were provided counsel "prior to
[their] preliminary examination by a magistrate" 10 5 while the federal rules did not provide the right to counsel until the defendant "appears in court without counsel." 0 6
The point when the right to counsel attaches under the Sixth
Amendment was clarified in 1972 when the United States
Supreme Court decided Kirby v. Illinois.'0 7 A plurality of the
court determined that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance
of counsel does not attach until a "critical stage" 0 8 in the criminal process is reached through "[t] he initiation of judicial criminal proceedings."'0 9 The point where 'judicial criminal
proceedings" commence may include the "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 10
The "critical stage" of a prosecution is the point in the proceed101. The Minnesota Statute providing for the assistance of counsel, as it appeared in
1993, read:
All officers or persons having in their custody a person restrained of liberty,
except in cases where imminent danger of escape exists, shall admit any attorney retained by or on behalf of the person restrained, or whom the restrained
person may desire to consult, to a private interview at the place of custody.
Such custodians, upon request of the person restrained, as soon as practicable,
and before other proceedings shall be had, shall notify the attorney of the
request for a consultation with the attorney. At all times through the period of
custody, whether or not the person restrained has been charged, tried, convicted, or is serving an executed sentence, reasonable telephone access to the
attorney shall be provided to the person restrained at no charge to the attorney or to the person restrained.
MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (Supp. 1993).
102. See Yale Kamisar & Jesse H. Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1963-1964).
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 2-3.
105. Id. at 2 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 611.07 (1961)).
106. Id. at 2 n.3 (quoting FED. R. CuM. P. 44 (1961)).
107. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
108. Id. at 690 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1968)).
109. Id. at 689.
110. Id.
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ings when counsel's presence is necessary to secure later trial
rights, such as the right to a fair trial, effective assistance of counsel, and confrontation and cross examination of witnesses."'
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, therefore, only applies
to the commencement of "formal" adversary judicial
12
proceedings.
The mere possibility that an informal proceeding may later
have important consequences at trial is not enough to trigger
the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.1 1 3 Thus, the
Sixth Amendment right does not attach during police investigation or interrogation." 4 There is no right to counsel under the
United States Constitution until the "government's role shifts
from investigation to accusation"-in other words, not until formal charges are initiated." 5 This interpretation finds support in
the text of the United States Constitution, which explicitly refers
to "criminal prosecutions."'16
In Minnesota, disputes involving an accused's right to counsel
under article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution typically
are raised in driving while intoxicated (DWI) proceedings. The
Minnesota "implied consent" statute requires that motorists who
refuse to submit to a breathalyzer or chemical test lose the right
to drive for a minimum period of one year." 7 In State v.
Palmer,"8 the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that under both
the federal and state constitutions, there is no right to have
assistance of counsel before deciding to submit to a chemical
test." 9 The suspension of a drivers license was characterized as
"civil or administrative" in nature and, therefore, not a "criminal
prosecution" that triggers the right to counsel. 120 At the time,
111. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967).
112. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in proceedings for petty offenses (punishable by imprisonment for less than six months) and misdemeanors, as
well as non-petty crimes. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972)
(holding that an indigent defendant must be appointed counsel to defend a petty offense accusation).
113. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986).
114. Id. at 431.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 430.
U.S. CONSr. amend. VI.
MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b), subd. 4 (1992).
291 Minn. 302, 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971).
Id. at 306, 191 N.W.2d at 190.
Id.
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this interpretation was accepted in other states with "virtual
unanimity. "121
Shortly after Palmer, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided
Prideaux v. State Department of Public Safety,1 22 reversing the court's
earlier position, to hold that the decision whether to submit to
chemical testing is arguably a "critical stage" and requires a limited right to consult with counsel.' 2 3 The court based its decision not on constitutional grounds, but, rather, on the legislative
intent behind the 1887 statute 124 which was said to reflect "a
longstanding Minnesota policy to allow accused persons immediate access to counsel." 125 In 1978, in response to Prideaux, the
legislature amended the implied consent statute to allow limited
1 26
access to counsel prior to chemical testing.
In 1984, the implied consent statute was again amended to
deny the right to consult with an attorney prior to chemical testing. 127 This provision was subsequently challenged under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in Nyflot v.
Commissioner of Public Safety. 12 8 The Nyflot court determined that
with the 1984 amendment, the legislature intended to abandon
the limited right to counsel conferred by Prideaux.129 The court
held that the decision to submit to chemical testing is not a "critical stage" of a criminal prosecution where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. 130 In his dissent, howeverJustice
121. Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 388 n.3 (Minn. 1976)
(listing state courts that characterize chemical testing as a civil proceeding and not a
"critical stage" requiring constitutional protection).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 394.
124. Id. at 391-92; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
125. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 391.
126. 1978 MINN. LAws 792, ch. 727, § 3, subd. 2(b) (3). The North Dakota Supreme
Court relied directly on Prideaux to determine that a motorist has a qualified statutory
right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to a chemical test.
Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 287 (N.D. 1987). The North Dakota
court construed a similar implied consent statute and based its decision on statutory
rather than state constitutional grounds. Id. However, in quoting the Minnesota
Supreme Court, it stated that based on the "fundamental nature of the right [§ 481.10]
affords... the chemical-testing process [is] a 'proceeding' within the meaning of [the
statute] before which consultation with counsel is to be accorded." Id. (quoting Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 393). Cf Clontz v.Jensen, 416 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Neb. 1987) (finding no right exists for a motorist to consult with an attorney prior to submitting to a
chemical test).
127. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(1) (1984).
128. 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1985).
129. Id. at 515.
130. Id. at 515-16.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss2/8

20

1994]

Tunheim:
Criminal
Justice:UNDER
Expanded
Protections
under the
Minnesota Consti
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
THE
MINNESOTA
CONSTITUTION

485

Yetka referred to the Minnesota Constitution and posited that
"[a] state is free to offer its citizens greater protection in its constitution than is offered by the federal law." t3 1
The right to counsel under the implied consent law was then
challenged under article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution in Friedmanv. Commissioner of Public Safety.13 2 In Friedman,a
motorist arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated failed
1 33
to respond after being read the implied consent advisory.
The police interpreted her lack of response as a refusal, and her
license was revoked for one year.1 34 On appeal, Friedman argued that her right to counsel under the state constitution was
violated since she was unable to consult with an attorney until
after testing. 13 ' The court of appeals was not persuaded that a
higher standard of protection was required under the Minnesota
136
Constitution than its federal counterpart.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that a limited right to counsel exists at the point when an individual is
requested to undergo chemical testing.1 37 Writing for the majority, Justice Yetka rejected the argument that license revocation is
a purely civil proceeding and held that a driver stopped for a
possible DWI violation is at a "critical stage" of a criminal proceeding. 138 The court further stated that because the Federal
Bill of Rights was recently eroded, states could appropriately expand their protection of individual liberties through state bills of
1 39
rights.
131. Id. at 523.
132. 455 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
133. Id. at 94. "The advisory stated that Friedman's driver's license would be revoked for [one] year if she refused the chemical test for blood alcohol, that the refusal
or the results of the test would be used against her at trial, and that she had a right to
consult an attorney after testing." Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473
N.W.2d 828, 829 (Minn. 1991).
134. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 829.
135. Friedman, 455 N.W.2d at 97.
136. Id. at 96.
137. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 835. The court, relying on article I, § 6 of the Minnesota Constitution, held that "an individual has the right, upon request, to a reasonable
opportunity to obtain legal advice before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing." Id.
138. Id. at 833. The court relied on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975),
which defined "critical stage" as "those pretrial procedures that would impair defense
on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel." Friedman, 473
N.W.2d at 833.
139. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 835.
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On the same day the opinion was issued, the implications of
Friedman were tested in the case of McDonnell v. Commissioner of
Public Safety.14 ° In this consolidated action, several motorists arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated were told by police that pursuant to the implied consent statute, they were
subject to criminal charges for refusal to undergo a breath test
and could consult with an attorney after testing was completed. 41 In three cases, revocation of the motorists' drivers
licenses was rescinded by the supreme court after the court concluded that, based on Friedman, the right to counsel independently guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the Minnesota
Constitution attaches earlier than its federal counterpart.1 4 2
Whether Minnesota courts are willing to construe the state
constitutional right to counsel more expansively in other areas
of the criminal law is unclear. In at least one other area, police
interrogations, the right to counsel has briefly been addressed.
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
once an arrested defendant indicates a desire to consult with
counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is present. 14 3 In
State v. Everett,144 the defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant for probation revocation and subsequently was questioned
with regard to an unrelated murder investigation.1 45 The defendant contended that the uncounselled interrogation violated
his right to counsel under both the federal and state constitutions. 146 Relying on the United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota court concluded that the right to counsel does not attach
during an investigatory stage, despite the defendant's current
representation by counsel in some unrelated matter.1 4 7 The
court, therefore, declined in this instance to provide expanded
rights under the Minnesota Constitution.
There may, however, be support for expanded rights to counsel under the state constitution for guilty pleas elicited from an
140. 473 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1991).
141. Id. at 850-52.
142. Id. at 853.
143. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
144. 472 N.W.2d 864 (Minn. 1991).
145. Id. at 866.
146. Id. at 867.
147. Id. at 868. The court cited McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), which
held that a Mirandaright to counsel is "offense-specific" in the sense that the right may
not be intertwined with an unrelated, uncharged offense. Everet4 472 N.W.2d at 868.
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indigent defendant. In Bolstad v. State,'14 the trial court accepted
an indigent defendant's guilty plea, made without the assistance
of counsel, to a felony charge.' 4 9 The guilty plea was suppressed
from a sentencing determination that followed a later criminal
conviction since it was elicited without the benefit of counsel. 50
The Bolstad court reasoned that Minnesota case law and rules
of criminal procedure guarantee rights to counsel beyond those
provided by federal dictates.'
While waiver of the right to
counsel under the federal rules simply requires the intentional
relinquishment of a known right,'5 2 the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure require the appointment of counsel for an
indigent defendant in felony or gross misdemeanor cases, even
1 53
where the defendant specifically refuses the right to counsel.
Although this decision may implicate constitutional issues, it appears to be based on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds. In summary, while the Minnesota Supreme Court has
used the Minnesota Constitution to expand the right to counsel
in DWI cases, the court has thus far declined to extend additional protection in other areas of criminal law.
IV.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

An accused's right against self-incrimination can be traced to
outrage against the "inquisitorial and manifestly unjust" methods of interrogation used in England as early as 1688.154 This
right, as provided in the Fifth Amendment, is intended to protect individuals against "overzealous police practices."' 5 5 As Justice Goldberg stated in Escobedo v. State of Illinois.15 6
148. 439 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
149. Id. at 51.
150. Id. at 52.
151. Id. (citing State v. Edmison, 379 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Minn. 1985)).
152. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
153. MINN. R. CriM. P. 5.02 subd. 1.
154. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896).
While... confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have
always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence... the temptation
to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to
push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is
so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials ... made the system so
odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.
Id.
155. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
156. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern,
that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable
and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on
extrinsic evidence
independently secured through skillful
57
investigation. 1

With respect to the right against compelled self-incrimination,
the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution
are identically worded. The relevant language of each provides
that "[n] o person shall ...

be compelled in any criminal case to

be a witness against himself."' 5 8
Self-incrimination challenges often concern the admissibility
of statements obtained from persons subjected to custodial police interrogation. 5 9 In order to safeguard the privilege against
self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, a Mirandawarning is given prior to questioning. 60 An accused may
waive the right against self-incrimination if the waiver is made
"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."'
The State must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession was
voluntarily given.' 62 The prosecution is also required to prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, an effective waiver of Miranda rights.'

63

With one exception, Minnesota courts have declined to expand the privilege against self-incrimination beyond that protected by the Federal Constitution. 64 The supreme court
recognizes that, although the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is persuasive, it is not a
157. Id. at 488-89.
158. Compare U.S. CONST., amend. V with MINN. CONST., art. I, § 7.
159. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). "Custodial interrogation" refers to "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484 (1972).
163. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1896). Some states rely on state constitutional principles for imposing a greater burden on the prosecution to demonstrate
a waiver of Miranda rights. See, e.g., State v. Thibodeau, 496 A.2d 635, 640 (Me. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986) (finding that the state must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt).
164. See State v. Brown, 488 N.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), reversed,State
v. Brown, 500 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. 1993).
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compelling force when interpreting the self-incrimination clause
165
in the Minnesota Constitution.
In State v. Murphy,1 6 6 the defendant was convicted of first degree murder based on statements he made to his probation officer who supervised him on an unrelated matter. 167 The terms
of Murphy's probation required him to be truthful in all matters
during his sex offender treatment plan.' 6 8 After the defendant
confessed to his probation officer that he committed a rape and
murder, the officer reported the confession to police. 6 9 At an
omnibus hearing, Murphy moved to suppress the confession, alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.1 70 The district
court denied the motion and certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court.171 The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the probation officer's failure to warn Murphy of his rights
before questioning barred the use of the confession at trial. 72
The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari and the case was
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.' 7 3 The Court determined that the confession was not obtained in a coercive setting and was not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. 1 74 On remand, Murphy was convicted. 1 75 He then

challenged the conviction under article I, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution. 176 The Minnesota Supreme Court declined
to expand the protection afforded by the state constitution, finding that the United States Supreme Court's interpretation was
"inherently persuasive" absent evidence of a contrary philosophy
1 77
in the Minnesota criminal justice system.
In her dissent, Justice Wahl distinguished Minnesota interpretations of voluntariness and the effective waiver of counsel from
165. State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 770-71 (Minn. 1986) [hereinafter Murphy I1].
166. Id. at 769-70.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 769.
169. Id. at 770.
170. Murphy II, 380 N.W.2d at 770.
171. Id.
172. State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982) [hereinafter Murphy I].
173. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
174. Id. at 440.
175. Murphy II, 380 N.W.2d at 770.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 771. The court viewed the issue as "whether the unique relationship existed between probationer and probation officer as seen in the light of the philosophy
of the Minnesota criminal justice system requires us to adopt a view contrary to that
expressed by the United States Supreme Court .... " Id.
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federal decisions 78 She concluded that, under Minnesota law,
"any sense of compulsion" to incriminate oneself may constitute
an ineffective waiver of self-incrimination rights that precludes
the use of such evidence. 179 By contrast, under the Federal Constitution, voluntariness is presumed if an individual makes incriminating statements rather than explicitly claiming a Fifth
Amendment right.18 0 Although Murphy's confession did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights, Justice Wahl would afford
greater protection under the Minnesota Constitution to suppress
the incriminating statements."8
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Collins v. State, also declined to expand rights under the Minnesota Constitution.' 8 2
Here, a burglary suspect made a spontaneous, pre-Miranda incriminating statement to his arresting officers during routine
questioning while he was being booked."8 The court, relying on
a United States Supreme Court decision, held that routine questioning was not "interrogation" and therefore did not require a
Miranda warning.8 4 The court further determined that these
facts did not warrant a broader grant of self-incrimination rights
than provided by federal law.' 85
The court of appeals was willing, however, to expand rights
against self-incrimination under the Minnesota Constitution in
State v. Brown."8 6 This case involved the prosecution of a mother
for physically assaulting her two-year-old daughter.8 7 Initially,
Brown's live-in boyfriend was arrested and charged with the assault and the child was put into foster care.' 8 A court order
directed Brown to undergo psychological and drug dependency
178. Id. at 774-75 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 774 (relying on State v. losue, 220 Minn. 283, 19 N.W.2d 735 (1945)).
180. Murphy II, 380 N.W.2d at 775.
181. See id at 776-77.
182. 385 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
183. Id. at 53.
184.. Id. at 54 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)).
185. Id. at 55. Another appellate court reached a similar result in State v. Tuomi,
396 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Under federal law, the Fifth Amendment does
not require the suppression of statements made after a Miranda warning is accompanied by a valid waiver. The defendant in this case argued that pre-Mirandastatements
should be suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine." See Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 303 (1985). The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, found the
Supreme Court decision "inherently persuasive" and declined to expand its interpretation. Tuomi, 396 N.W.2d at 851.
186. 488 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) [hereinafter Brown 1].
187. Id. at 850.
188. Id.
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evaluations before visitation would be permitted."i 9 Relying on
the advice of counsel, Brown did not undergo the evaluations.1 9 °
She was advised that the evaluations might incriminate her if
charges were eventually brought against her for the assault.1 9 1
At her boyfriend's trial, Brown testified that she alone was responsible for the child's injuries.1 9 As a result, the boyfriend
was acquitted. 193 Brown was then charged and tried for the assault. 19 4 Brown testified on her own behalf and recanted the testimony she gave at the prior trial. 195 She said she perjured
herself in order to exculpate her boyfriend and thereby convince him not to leave her. 9 6 During cross examination, Brown
was asked, over defense counsel's objection, whether she had visited her daughter since the child was put into foster care. 19 7 She
stated that she had not, and also testified that her attorney had
counseled her not to submit to the evaluations required by the
court because they might incriminate her. 19 8 Brown was convicted of the assault charge.' 99
Brown's conviction was upheld on appeal.2 °0 On petition for
further review, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision regarding all issues reached, but remanded the case for a determination of whether allowing the
cross examination about the reasons why Brown failed to visit
her daughter amounted to prejudicial error. 201 The court of appeals found that the cross examination violated Brown's right
against self-incrimination under the Minnesota Constitution. 20 2
On subsequent appeal, Brown's conviction was reinstated by the
23
Minnesota Supreme Court.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Brown I, 488 N.W.2d at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id.

195. Id.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
1991),
201.
202.
203.

Brown 1, 488 N.W.2d at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Brown, No. C4-91-305, 1991 WL 271489, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24,
petitionfor review granted in part, denied in part (Minn. 1992).
Brown, 488 N.W.2d at 852.
Id.
State v. Brown, 500 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Minn. 1993) [hereinafter Brown 17].
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits use of a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for impeachment. 2°4 However, the use of a defendant's post-arrest silence before the administration of
Mirandais not barred. 2 5 Nor does the Federal Constitution bar
use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence to impeach a defendant's
credibility. 2 6 However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals distinguished these cases in Brown because they did not involve a defendant who remained silent upon the advice of counseL2° 7 The
court concluded that while it was unclear whether Brown's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated under
the Federal Constitution, it was violated under the Minnesota
Constitution. 20 1 "[W]e believe the Minnesota Constitution, article I, section 7, extends her right against self-incrimination beyond minimal federal constitutional guarantees." 20 9 The court
relied on State v. BillupS21' for the proposition that Minnesota
law rejects any distinction between counseled pre-Miranda silence and counseled post-Miranda silence.2 1 ' Therefore, the
court of appeals found that the cross examination regarding
Brown's counseled pre-arrest decision not to undergo possibly
incriminating evaluations violated her rights under the Minnesota Constitution. 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the
conviction. 2 13 The court held that the right against compelled
self-incrimination was not properly invoked and, therefore, the
Minnesota Constitution was not implicated. 21 4 The privilege
against self-incrimination was not implicated by prosecutorial
questioning, according to the court, unless the required answers
to those questions would "in themselves support a conviction or
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
204. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
205. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982).
206. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980).
207. Brown 1, 488 N.W.2d at 851.

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 264 N.W.2d 137 (Minn. 1978).
211. Brown , 488 N.W.2d at 852.
212. Id. Billups was decided before the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) andJenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980). See
Billups, 264 N.W.2d at 137 (1978). Moreover, the Billups decision interpreted the scope
of protection offered by the Fifth Amendment, not the state constitution. Id. at 138-39.
213. Brown II, 500 N.W.2d at 788.
214. Id. at 787.
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The court reasoned that answers to the prosecuaccused." '
tor's questions about whether Brown visited her daughter or underwent the required chemical dependency evaluations would
furnish a link in the
not in themselves support a conviction 2 1or
6
chain of evidence needed to prosecute.
The Brown decision appears to negate the broader protection
against self-incrimination which surfaced, albeit temporarily,
under Minnesota law. The right combination of facts, however,
may convince the supreme court to abandon the "persuasive"
federal standard.
V.

RIGHT

To

IMPARTIAL JURY TRIAL

The right to an impartial jury trial is founded on reluctance to
entrust decisions that affect an accused's life and liberty to one
judge or group ofjudges.2 1 7 This policy is sustained by the participation of the community in determinations of guilt and by
the application of the common sense of laymen who, as jurors,
consider the case. 1 Providing defendants with the right to be
judged by their peers, guards "against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or eccentric
judge. '219 Both the federal and state constitutions require that
"[iln all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to a ...

public trial by an impartial jury ....

220 In 1869, twelve

years after the adoption of the Minnesota Constitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided State v. Everett,22 1 which determined that an "impartial jury" must consist of twelve
members.2 2 2 By contrast, the right to trial by a jury of twelve is
not guaranteed under the Federal Constitution.2 23
215. Id.
216. Id. The defendant argued that testimony about her lawyer's advice to forego
the evaluations could implicate her in front of the jury by implying that she admitted
]
guilt to her attorney. The court responded by stating that "[w hile there is some remote
'told
her attorney that she was
that
Defendant
had
jury
could
infer
possibility that a
guilty,' such an inference requires a leap of faith which this court, on the facts before
us, is unwilling to make." Id.
217. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
218. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
219. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
220. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
221. 14 Minn. 330 (1869).
222. Id. at 332.
223. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155 (citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604
(1900)).
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The United States Supreme Court has determined that, under
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a jury
consisting of five persons is unconstitutional because it is of inadequate size to promote deliberations, insulate members from
outside intimidation, and provide a representative cross-section
of the community.2 24 A conviction by a less than unanimous sixmember jury deprives an accused of the constitutional right to
trial by jury as well.22 5 In Williams v. Florida 6 however, the
Court held that a twelve-person jury is not required for certain
non-capital criminal offenses under the Sixth Amendment; in
2 27
these cases, a six-person jury is permissible.
Following the Williams decision, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a statute that allowed a six-person jury in misdemeanor
cases. 2 28 This statute was challenged under the Minnesota Constitution in State v. Hamm. 2 9 In this case, the defendant moved
for a trial by a twelve-person jury after being charged with driving while intoxicated.23 0 The motion was denied and Hamm was
convicted by a panel of six jurors.2 3 ' On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and struck the statute as
unconstitutional, holding that article I, section 6 required a
twelve-person jury.232 Writing for the court, Justice Yetka rejected the Williams decision.2 33 He restated his firmly held view
that Minnesota courts "must remain independently responsible
for safeguarding the rights of our own citizens." 234 Justice Yetka
also rejected arguments for overruling Everett, contending that
the only way that the Minnesota Constitution should be changed
is by "consent of the people in the form of a constitutional
224. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978) (striking down a Georgia statute
allowing conviction by a unanimous five-person jury).
225. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979).
226. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
227. Id. at 86, 102-03.
228. See MINN. STAT. § 593.01, subd. 1 (1986).
229. 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988).
230. Id. at 380.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 382. Minnesota Statute § 593.01, subd. 1 (1986) was repealed in 1990. See
MINN. STAT. § 593.01 (1992).
233. Haem, 423 N.W.2d at 382. "In our view, the conclusion of the United States
Supreme Court in Williams ...is of little relevance here today." Id. "In interpreting our
state constitution, we decline to follow the same path taken by Williams in interpreting
the federal Constitution." Id. at n.2.
234. Id.
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amendment."2 3' 5 Yetka reached this conclusion despite a lack 236
of
express language in the constitution requiring ajury of twelve.
Hamm makes it clear that the court continues to interpret the
Minnesota Constitution to guarantee an expanded right to trial
by an impartial jury, a broader right than under the United
States Constitution. 3 7
VI.

UNREASONABLE

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures can be
traced to an early decision in England that prohibited the issuance of general search warrants. 238 Lord Camden wrote, "The
great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure
their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged
by some public law for the good of the whole."23 9
The principles articulated by Lord Camden "affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. "24° In his nomination hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Justice Rehnquist stated, with respect to an individual's state constitutional search and seizure rights, that:
The Federal Constitution certainly lays down one rule for all
[fifty] States, and if some States want a more stringent prohibition against searches and seizures than that provided by the
fourth amendment, it just makes sense that they ought to
have it. If some States are content with the Federal provision,
which everybody has to live up to, it seems to me that makes
235. Id. at 383.
236. Id. at 382.
237. In State v. Hegg, 410 N.W.2d 152 (N.D. 1987), the North Dakota Supreme
Court reached a similar result. In Hegg, a statute required a written demand for a jury
of 12. Id. at 153. The defendant appealed his conviction by a six-person jury, contending that the conviction violated his right to a twelve-person jury under the North Dakota
Constitution. Id. The court found that the statute violated the defendant's right to a
jury of twelve guaranteed under the state constitution. Id. at 154.
Article I, § 13 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate. A person accused of a crime for which he may be confined for a period of more
than one year has the right of trial by ajury of twelve. The legislative assembly
may determine the size of the jury for all other cases, provided that the jury
consists of at least six members. All verdicts must be unanimous.
N.D. CONST., art. I, § 13.
238. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886) (citing Entick v. Carrington
and Three Other King's Messengers, 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029 (1765)).
239. Id. at 627 (quoting Entick, 19 Howell's St. Trials at 1029).
240. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
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sense for them to have that.... I do not think the [United
States Supreme] Court is necessarily the final arbiter of the
law of the land. It is the final arbiter of the U.S. Constitution
and of the meaning of Federal statutes and treaties. But we
still live in a somewhat pluralistic society where the States'
highest courts are the final arbiters of the meaning of their
State constitutions. That is just as it ought to be ....
The Minnesota and United States Constitutions each provide
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated ... 242 In several areas of search
and seizure, the Minnesota Constitution has been interpreted to
afford greater protection than that provided by the Federal Constitution. One example is the application of the exclusionary
doctrine.
The exclusionary doctrine provides that evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible at trial in
state court. 243 However, the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule that exists under the Fourth Amendment has not
been recognized under the Minnesota Constitution. Under the
Federal Constitution, the exclusionary rule does not apply where
evidence is obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that is ultimately found to be unsupported by probable
cause or is otherwise invalid. 244 Thus, where police have acted in
objective good faith, evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment may be used in the prosecution's case-inchief.245 By contrast, this "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule has been held not to apply to article I, section 10 of
the Minnesota Constitution. 4 6 In Minnesota, evidence obtained
in violation of article I, section 10 of the state constitution is suppressed from trial regardless whether the police acted in good
faith.2 4 7
241. Nomination ofJustice William Hubbs Rehnquist: HearingsBefore the Committee On the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 141 (1986) (statement of Justice
Rehnquist).
242. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
243. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
244. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984).
245. Id. Since the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct,
punishing the errors ofjudges would not serve the deterrent purpose. Id. at 918-21.
246. See State v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
247. Id. at 109.
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In State v. Albrecht,2 4' an anonymous informant told police that
Albrecht was a marijuana dealer.2 49 The informant provided police with a description of the suspect's vehicle, but was unable to
provide a specific address.2 5 ° A magistrate issued a search warrant based on probable cause, but, because easily verifiable facts
were not corroborated, the supreme court upheld the trial
court's determination that probable cause was insufficient under
article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. 25 1 The state
urged the court to adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to allow the use of evidence obtained by officers who act
in reasonable reliance on an ultimately invalid search warrant
that was issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.2 5 2 The
supreme court refused to adopt the good faith exception..25 By
rejecting the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, Minnesota affords greater rights under its constitution than does the
Federal Constitution.
Another example of expanded rights under the Minnesota
Constitution is found in our definition of what constitutes a
"seizure." The United States Supreme Court ruled, in California
v. Hodari,25 4 that "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment may
occur in either of two ways: (1) when a law enforcement officer
physically lays a hand on the person, or (2) when the person
submits to the officer's show of authority. 25 5 The Minnesota
Supreme Court explicitly rejected this definition25 6of seizure
under the state constitution in In re Welfare of E.D.J
In that case, E.D.J. and two other men turned and began walking in the opposite direction after noticing an approaching police car. 255 After police ordered the men to stop, E.DJ.
continued for approximately five additional steps, dropped
something, took two more steps, and then stopped and turned
248. Id. at 107.
249. Id. at 108.
250. Id.
251. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d at 109.
252. Id. This is the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as it applies to the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 919-21 (1984).
253. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d at 109.
254. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
255. Id. at 625.
256. 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Minn. 1993).
257. Id. at 780.
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around.25 8 Tests later revealed that the bag dropped by E.DJ.
contained crack cocaine. 25 9 The defendant moved to suppress
the evidence as fruit of an illegal seizure.2 60 The motion was denied when the district court, relying on Hodari, determined that
the cocaine was abandoned prior to the seizure and, therefore,
the constitutional protections for seizures did not apply.2 6 The
court of appeals, also relying on Hodari,affirmed the definition
of seizure and declined to interpret the state constitution differently than the interpretation given to the Federal
Constitution.2 6 2
Exercising its independent authority to interpret the state constitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and rejected the Hodari decision.2 63 The court concluded that the definition of seizure under the Minnesota Constitution will continue to be the broader "totality of the
circumstances" approach which analyzes whether a reasonable
person in the defendant's shoes would have concluded that he
or she was not free to leave.2 64 Thus, under the Fourth Amendment standard, there was no "seizure" of E.D.J. until after he
actually stopped and submitted to the police, and the evidence
obtained was not the suppressible fruit of an illegal seizure.2 65
Under the Minnesota Constitution, however, there was a
"seizure" when the police directed E.D.J. to stop, and the evidence was suppressed on these grounds.2 6 6
A recent decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court provided
perhaps the clearest example of expanded search and seizure
protection. The court, on appeal, reconciled a pair of inconsistent decisions by the Minnesota Court of Appeals regarding the
constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint roadblocks. 26 7 The
258. Id.
259. In re Welfare of E.D.J., 492 N.W.2d 829, 830 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 830-31.
263. In re E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 781.
264. Id. at 783.
265. Id. at 781.
266. Id. at 783. E.D.J. dropped the bag after he was directed to stop. Id.
267. Compare Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 362, 363 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (finding that "[a] bsent empirical evidence that sobriety checkpoints advance the public interest, wholesale suspicionless seizures violate article I, section 10 of
the Minnesota Constitution and the right of privacy guaranteed by the Minnesota Bill
of Rights") with Gray v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (finding that "[a] sobriety checkpoint that reasonably advances the state's
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United States Supreme Court has held that a Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurs during a sobriety checkpoint stop. 268 Determining whether such a seizure is reasonable involves a threeprong analysis, known as the Brown test, which weighs: (1) the
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure; (2) the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest; and (3)
the severity of the interference with individual liberty.2 6 9
In Ascher v. Commissionerof Public Safety,27 ° the court of appeals
relied on Michigan v. Sitzi"' to determine that the sobriety checkpoint provided a reasonable method of dealing with drunk driv2 2
ing and, therefore, reasonably advances the public interest.
Thus, prong two of the Brown test was satisfied under the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.27 3 However, the court
also analyzed this issue under the Minnesota Constitution and
determined that the second prong of the Brown test was not satisfied.2 74 The court based its decision on a lack of empirical evidence to suggest that sobriety checkpoint arrests represent an
increase in the number of arrests over what would have occurred
through conventional methods of law enforcement. 2 75 With respect to the degree that sobriety checkpoints advance the public
interest, the court declined to limit the protection afforded by
to that provided by the Fourth
the state constitution
27 6
Amendment.
In a decision filed on the same day as Ascher, the court of appeals in Gray v. Commissioner of Public Safey2 7 7 held that sobriety
interest in preventing drunk driving and does not excessively intrude upon the privacy
rights of a law abiding driver does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution"); see generally Cynthia R. Bartell, Giving Sobriety Checkpoints the Cold
Shoulder in Minnesota: A Proposed Balancing Test for Suspicionless Seizures Under the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 515, (1994).
268. Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990).
269. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
270. Ascher, 505 N.W.2d at 362.
271. 496 U.S. at 454-55 (holding that there only needs to be a demonstration that
the sobriety checkpoint provided a reasonable method of dealing with drunk driving to
satisfy the second prong of the Brown test).
272. Ascher, 505 N.W.2d at 365.
273. Id. The court dismissed the first prong of the Brown analysis with little discussion, noting that, "[n]o one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving
problem or the States' interest in eradicating iL" Id. at 365 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 44849).
274. Id. at 368.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 367.
277. 505 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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checkpoints do not violate either the state or federal constituions.
In applying the Sitz analysis, the court determined that
prong two of the Brown test was satisfied since the roadblock provided a reasonable method of dealing with drunk driving.2 79
The court rejected the argument that because this particular
roadblock was instituted solely by the police, it was flawed be28 °
cause no politically accountable individuals were involved .
The court explicitly declined to afford greater protection under
the Minnesota Constitution.2 1
In June 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that sobriety checkpoints are unconstitutional under the Minnesota Constitution, finding that there was no persuasive reason to dispense
with the individualized suspicion standard that Minnesota courts
have "long held" to be required under article I, section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution.2 8 2 The majority, relying on the Brennan and Stevens dissents in Sitz, concluded that the Sitz analysis
was too "radical" a departure from the Brown test because it allowed police officers to decide for themselves the reasonableness
2 83
of their own conduct.
VII.

CONFRONTATION

A criminal defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses at
the time of trial forms "the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause."2 a4 The United States Supreme Court has
observed that:
[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses
cannot be proved against an accused ...

except by witnesses

who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look while
being tried, whom he is entitled to cross examine, and whose
testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the
278. Id. at 362.
279. Id. at 360-61.
280. Id. In Sitz, the court noted that the choice among which law enforcement procedures to employ should be borne by politically accountable officials. See Sitz, 496 U.S.
at 453-54. The Gray court rejected this argument, reasoning that police officers are still
answerable to elected officials and consequently to the public. Gray, 505 N.W.2d at 361.
281.
282.
(Minn.
283.
284.

Gray, 505 N.W.2d at 362.
See Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, No. C3-93-364, 1994 WL 314712
June 30, 1994).
Id.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970).
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established rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal
28 5
cases.

The right of confrontation expresses "something deep in human
nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused
and accuser [as] 'essential to a fair trial.' ",286 "A witness 'may feel
quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the
man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the

facts.' "217 Face-to-face confrontation, which admittedly may also
upset truthful witnesses, remains valuable
because it can "con288
found and undo the false accuser."
In language nearly identical to the Sixth Amendment guarantee for an accused "to be confronted [by] the witnesses against
him,"2 8 9 the Minnesota Constitution provides that "[t] he accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." 29 0 The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation binding on the states. 91
The right of confrontation assures both that an accused receives
an opportunity to cross examine adverse witnesses and that the
jury will be able to weigh the demeanor and credibility of such
witnesses. 9 2 United States Supreme Court cases that address the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause "fall into two broad,
285. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47, 55 (1899)). Justice Blackmun argues that the Confrontation Clause is most
concerned with giving the trier of fact the right to observe the testifying witness:
The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions
or ex pante affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross examination of the witness in which the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of
the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order
that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 1026 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736-37 (1987)).
286. Id. at 1017 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
287. Id. at 1019 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 35
(1956)).
288. Id. at 1020.
289. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
290. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
291. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d
96, 102 (Minn. 1981).
292. See also, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39, 51-52 (1987); State v. Hamilton, 289 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Minn. 1979) (citing
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)) (stating that "[t]he right to confrontation
includes both the opportunity to cross examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh
the demeanor of the witness").
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albeit not exclusive, categories: 'cases involving the admission of
out-of-court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed
by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross

examination.'

"293

The Supreme Court has held that "the [Confrontation] Clause
permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the defendant's inability to
confront the declarant at trial."2 9 4 Under the leading federal
case of Ohio v. Roberts,2 9 5 two general requirements protect an
accused's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation with respect
to out-of-court statements. 29 6 First, the prosecution must either
produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the witness whose
out-of-court statement the prosecution wishes to use against the

For an analysis of the importance of cross examination, see White v. Illinois, 112 S.
Ct. 736, 743 (1992) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (stating that
cross examination is "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth"). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (finding that a criminal defendant must be allowed to impeach prosecution's juvenile witness based on the witness' delinquency record despite the state's high interest in preserving the
confidentiality of juvenile delinquency determinations); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 297-98 (1973) (finding that a party has a right to impeach the party's own
witness through cross examination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) ("There
are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more
nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and
cross examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial
which is this country's constitutional goal.").
293. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985)). See also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1014 (1988).
294. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990). In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,
813 (1990), the Court observed:
From the earliest days of our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, we have
consistently held that the Clause does not necessarily prohibit the admission
of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant, even though the admission
of such statements might be thought to violate the literal terms of the Clause.
We reaffirmed only recently that "[w]hile a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the
declarant is unavailable, this Court has rejected that view as 'unintended and
too extreme.' "
Id. at 813-14 (citations omitted) (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182
(1987)). Cf White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 744-48 (1992) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring) (stating that the "Confrontation Clause should be implicated by extrajudicial
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials").
295. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, the Supreme Court rejected a Confrontation
Clause challenge to the introduction at trial of a probable cause hearing transcript
containing testimony from a witness not produced at trial but who was cross examined
at the hearing. Id.
296. Id. at 65.
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accused.29 7 Second, after a showing of unavailability, the declarant's out-of-court statement is admitted only if the prosecution
demonstrates sufficient indicia of reliability or if the statement
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 9 8
At both federal and state levels, new developments that concern the right of confrontation frequently involve alleged child
sex abuse victims. 2 9 9 In Idaho v. Wright,3 0 the United States
Supreme Court considered the admissibility of a child's statements to her doctor. 30 ' The Court, applying the first prong of
the Roberts analysis, determined that the alleged child sex abuse
victim would be considered an unavailable witness for Sixth
purposes because she was
Amendment Confrontation Clause
3 0°2
deemed incompetent to testify.
297. Id. The prosecution must show that it made a good faith effort to secure its
witnesses for trial. Id. at 74-75. In State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1033 (1991), the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the prosecution satisfied this good faith requirement by attempting to have the child witness
declared competent to testify. Id. at 659.
298. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. See also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183
(1987) (finding that the state need not show independent indicia of reliability to admit
an unavailable co-conspirator's out-of-court statements because such statements constitute a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543
(1986) (finding that "even if certain hearsay evidence does not fall within 'a firmly
rooted hearsay exception' and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for
Confrontation Clause purposes, it may nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause reliability standards if it is supported by a 'showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'" ) (footnote and citation omitted).
In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Supreme Court indicated that
"[a]dmission under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court
statements." Id. at 817 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243, (1895); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Bouijaily 483 U.S. at 183; Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 552 (1986)).
The Wright Court cited the "excited utterance," "dying declaration," and "medical treatment" exceptions to the hearsay rule as firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions, but concluded that a residual hearsay exception is not firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause
purposes. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819-20.
299. See generally Neil C. McCabe, CriminalLaw Developments Under State Constitutions,
1989-1990, 3 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 25-30 (1990) (surveying approaches used
by states in addressing admissibility of an alleged child victim's statements); Ken Gormley, Significant Developments in State Constitutional Law, 1988, 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST.
CONST. L. 21-23 (1989) (discussing face to face confrontation where child victims are
involved).
300. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 816. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court found the alleged
child victim was incapable of communicating with the jury and defense counsel agreed
with this conclusion. Id. The Court also observed that the appellate court neither questioned this finding nor discussed the general requirement of unavailability. Id. The
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The Wright Court then held that, under Roberts' second prong,

the out-of-court statements of a child witness.3 will be admissible only if there were adequate indicia of reliability that arose
solely from the circumstances surrounding the statement3 0 4 and
cross examination would be of marginal utility. 30 5 The Court
Wright Court therefore concluded that "[flor purposes of deciding this case, we assume
without deciding that, to the extent the unavailability requirement applies in this case,
the younger daughter was an unavailable witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause." Id.
303. As in Roberts, the Wright Court indicated that the alleged child victim's statements would have been presumptively reliable if they had fallen into a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. Id. at 815-18.
304. Id. at 819-20. The Supreme Court in Wright stated that the particular guarantees of trustworthiness must be drawn only from the circumstances that surround the
making of the statement and "not by reference to other evidence at trial." Id. at 822.
The Court expressly disapproved considering such corroborating evidence, which
would "permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on
the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial." Id. at 823. Therefore, "unless an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement was made, provides a
basis for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance at
trial, the Confrontation Clause requires exclusion of the out-of-court statement." Id. at
821. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's reliance on physical evidence of
abuse, the opportunity the respondent had to commit the offense, and the older
daughter's corroborating identification of the accused were "irrelevant to a showing of
the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' necessary for admission of hearsay
statements under the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 826. The remaining factors that the
lower court considered-whether the child had a motive to fabricate the statements
and whether the statements were of the type that one would expect a child of her age to
fabricate-were relevant and admissible. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Blackmun, Justice Kennedy disapproved of the majority's refusal to consider corroborating evidence, stating that according to common sense, "one of the best ways to
determine whether what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by
other evidence." Id. at 828. Kennedy, indicating that this is a new rule in Federal Cons]
frontation Clause analysis, noted that "[ tates are of course free, as a matter of state law,
to demand corroboration of an unavailable child declarant's statements as well as other
indicia of reliability before allowing the statements to be admitted into evidence." Id. at
830-31. Justice Kennedy further indicated that:
Until today . . . no similar distinction could be found in [Supreme Court]
precedents interpreting the Confrontation Clause. If anything, the many state
statutes requiring corroboration of a child declarant's statements emphasize
the relevance, not the irrelevance, of corroborating evidence to the determination whether an unavailable child witness' statements bear particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness, which is the ultimate inquiry under the Confrontation Clause. In sum, whatever doubt the Court has with the weight to be
given the corroborating evidence found in this case is no justification for rejecting the considered wisdom of virtually the entire legal community that corroborating evidence is relevant to reliability and trustworthiness.
Id. at 832.
305. The Court stated that "if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility,
then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial." Wright, 497 U.S.
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identified reliability indicators to include: (1) spontaneity and
consistent repetition; (2) use of terminology unexpected of a
child of similar age; (3) statements elicited without leading questions; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.3 °6 The Court concluded that the statements by the child to a doctor were
unreliable because they were elicited during a highly suggestive
interview.3 °7
With respect to out-of-court statements, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has consistently relied on federal case law to define the scope of a defendant's right of confrontation under the
state constitution. 30 8 In State v. Lanam,3 0 9 a sex abuse case, the
defendant claimed that the admission of a nontestifying child
witness's statements to her doctor violated the right of confrontation.3 10 The Minnesota Supreme Court, relying heavily on
Wright, applied the general two-step Federal Confrontation
at 820. "Because evidence possessing 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'
must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, we think that evidence admitted under the former requirement must similarly be
so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability." Id. at 821 (citations omitted).
306. Id. at 821-22.
307. Id. at 826-27.
308. But cf State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 663 (Minn. 1990) (Kelley, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033 (1991) [hereinafter Lanam II]. In State v. Conklin, 444
N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn. 1989), the court indicated that:
The use of hearsay statements deprives the defendant of the right to confront
and cross examine the witness, and violates the requirement that testimony be
sworn, all of which are intended to protect the integrity of the factfinding
process by ensuring that only reliable evidence will be used against a defendant. Thus hearsay can be used against a criminal defendant at trial only if its
use is necessary, and only if the hearsay evidence is demonstrably reliable.
Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96,
102 (Minn. 1981)).
309. Lanam II, 459 N.W.2d at 656.
310. Id. at 658. In Lanam II, the statements of the child witness were admitted pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1988). Lanam II, 459 N.W.2d at 658. At the
time of the decision, subd. 3 provided:
An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of ten years...
alleging, explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual contact or penetration performed with or on the child or any act of physical abuse of the child
...not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible as
substantive evidence if:
(a) the court or person authorized to receive evidence finds, in a hearing
conducted outside of the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom
the statement is made provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(b) the child . . . either:
(i) testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of
the act; and

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994

41

WILL/AM
M/TCHIELL
William Mitchell
Law Review,
Vol. 20,LAW
Iss. 2 REVIEW
[1994], Art. 8

[Vol. 20

Clause analysis.3"' The court determined that, to the extent the
unavailability requirement applied, 1 2 the alleged victim was unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes because she was
produced for a competency hearing and found incompetent to
testify at trial.3 1 3 The Lanam II court then concluded that the
(c) the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceeding at which the proponent
intends to offer the statement into evidence to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
For purposes of this subdivision... [a] n unavailable witness includes an
incompetent witness.
MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1988). Section 595.02 specifically provided that an incompetent witness is "unavailable" for purposes of the statute. Id.
311. Lanam II, 459 N.W.2d at 659-61. Thus approving Wright's two generalized inquiries, the Lanam II court noted that "it seems clear that the United States Supreme
Court is willing to admit any kind of hearsay statement despite the confrontation clause
if the declarant is unavailable and the statement is sufficiently reliable." Id. at 659.
312. The court, following Idaho v. Wright, indicated that it reached its conclusion
"without deciding that the general requirement of unavailability applie[d]." Id. at 659.
313. Id. Accord State v. Oslund, 469 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
The Lanam II court specifically cited the language in Wright holding that a child
witness deemed incompetent is "an unavailable witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause." Lanam II, 459 N.W.2d at 659. The Minnesota Supreme Court also
pointed to Wright's specific rejection of the per se unreliability of a child's statements
simply because the trial court has found the child incompetent to testify. Id. at 661.
The court identified reasons that justified a finding of unavailability under the Wright
analysis to include "incompetence, the... Rules of Evidence grounds for unavailability,
the danger of severe psychological injury to a child victim from testifying, and an unwillingness or inability to testify." Id. at 659 (quoting Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation
Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72
MINN. L. REv. 523, 554 (1988)).
The trial court in Lanam I deemed the child incompetent to testify, concluding
that she was susceptible to suggestion and leading questions would easily elicit the
sought after response. State v. Lanam, 444 N.W.2d 882, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
[hereinafter Lanam 1]. In its order, the court also stated that "[t] he child's inability to
recount recent events (her summer vacation), and her apparent lack of understanding
about common, everyday occurrences, led the court to conclude that she was not competent to testify as a witness." Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that the alleged
child victim was incompetent at the time of trial to give testimony. Lanam I, 459
N.W.2d at 659-61. The supreme court pointed out that the trial court had not determined that the child was incompetent at the time she made the statements. Id. at 660.
Under Lanam II, a competency hearing addressed the ability of the witness to "remember or to relate" events. Id. at 659. "Ability" meant the ability to remember and relate
events generally, not the anticipated testimony. Id. at 659-60. Accord State v. Scott, 501
N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn. 1993) (holding that the trial court erroneously asked the child
about the subject matter of the criminal charges involved and instead the court should
have asked questions pertaining to name, age, school, and perception of a "lie"); see also
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 741 (1987) (stating that "questions at a competency
hearing usually are limited to matters that are unrelated to the basic issues of the trial"
such as name, age, school, and perception of a "lie").
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child's statements, although not covered by a firmly rooted hearsay exception, 314 satisfied the reliability factors set forth in
Wright,

15

and, therefore, did not violate the defendant's con-

314. In effect, the court concluded that Minnesota's residual hearsay exception is
not firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes. Lanam I, 459 N.W.2d at 659. In
Minnesota, exceptions to the general confrontation rule also exist. See, e.g., State v.
Salazar, 504 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. 1993) (including statements made for the purpose
of medical diagnosis or treatment where the child knew she was speaking to medical
personnel and that it was important she tell the truth); State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d
777, 785-86 (Minn. 1986) (addressing excited utterances); State v. Olson, 291 N.W.2d
203, 206 (Minn. 1980) (allowing dying declarations).
315. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Lanam II, echoed the United States
Supreme Court reliability factors set forth in Wright, concluding that:
[S] tatements admissible under a state's residual [hearsay] exception satisfy the
confrontation clause reliability requirement only if the state establishes that
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements
show the statements were 'sufficiently trustworthy'-that is, that it is 'particularly likely' that the declarant was telling the truth at the time of making the
statements. Stated differently, the focus is not on all the circumstances....
but only on those circumstances actually surrounding the making of the statements. These circumstances include, but are not limited to, whether the statements were spontaneous, whether the person talking with the child had a
preconceived idea of what the child should say, whether the statements were
in response to leading or suggestive questions, whether the child had any apparent motive to fabricate, and whether the statements are the type of statements one would expect a child of that age to fabricate.
Lanam 1, 459 N.W.2d at 661 (citations omitted) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,
821 (1990)). Accord State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911,915 (Minn. 1992) (citing Wright,
497 U.S. at 819) (finding that the trustworthiness of out-of-court statements depend on
the circumstances surrounding the making of such statements, not the evidence corroborating the statements).
The Lanam II court noted that the reliability finding was justified because the
child: (1) made her initial statement about the abuse spontaneously; (2) answered
questions from her foster mother and others by consistently describing the abuse; (3)
identified the defendant by name as the perpetrator; (4) identified where the defendant worked and lived; (5) stated that the defendant often sat with her at her mother's
house; (6) pointed out defendant's house one day as she and her foster mother drove
by it; (7) identified defendant when she saw him accidentally in the hall at the courthouse on the day of a hearing; (8) had no apparent motive to fabricate; and (9) made
statements that were not the type of statements one would expect a child of her age to
fabricate. Lanam HI, 459 N.W.2d at 661. The court also found it important that the
foster mother had no motive to falsely implicate defendant. Id. Accord State v. Salazar,
504 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. 1993) (applying Wright and admitting the statements of
the alleged victim and her brother as reliable because the mother did not want the
alleged victim to identify the defendant as the abuser, the victim and her brother had
no apparent motive to fabricate, and the statements were not the type of statements one
would expect children of their age to fabricate).
See a/so State v. Oslund, 469 N.W.2d 489, 493-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). In Oslund,
the court of appeals applied Roberts and Wright to find that the alleged child victim's
statements had sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness under the totality of the circumstances including: They were in language one would expect a child of her age to use;
the acts she demonstrated and described were of a nature one would not expect a
three-year-old to know; her statements were reasonably spontaneous; leading questions
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frontation right under either the Minnesota or the United States
constitutions.3 16 The Minnesota Supreme Court did not undertake an independent analysis of the defendant's rights under the
Minnesota confrontation clause.
Justice Kelley's dissent in Lanam II, joined by two other justices, urged that Minnesota courts offer a broader right of confrontation under the Minnesota Constitution.3 1 7 Kelley observed
that "historically, not only the framers of the Minnesota Constitution, but this court itself has generally tended to maximize the
basic constitutional right that an accused be afforded the right
to confront the accuser. ' 318 Justice Kelley argued that both article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution and the Minnesota
cases construing the clause have "histor[ies] independent of federal Sixth Amendment interpretations" 19 and together demonstrate a strong preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial.3 20 However, no Minnesota cases subsequent to Lanam II
were not overly suggestive; and three witnesses testifying to the child's statements had
no motive to fabricate. Id.
316. Lanam II, 459 N.W.2d at 661-62. The court also determined that the child's
statements met the reliability requirements under MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(a)
(1988), which required "an examination of the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement and the reliability of the person to whom the statement was made." Lanam II,
459 N.W.2d at 660. In determining reliability under the statute, unlike under the federal and state confrontation clauses, the court may consider corroborating physical evidence. Id.
317. Lanam II, 459 N.W.2d at 662 (Kelley, J., dissenting, Popovich, C.J., Yetka, J.,
joining). Justice Kelley cited with approval the Fullerexhortation, "as the highest court
of this state, we are independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of [our] citizens." Id. at 663 n.1 (quoting State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985)).
318. Id. at 663 n.1.
319. Id. at 663.
320. Id. at 665-66. Justice Kelley turned to the Minnesota constitutional debates to
find one delegate's explanation of the meaning in the language, "the accused shall
enjoy ... the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him," as follows:
I refer here again to the Constitution of the United States, framed by wiser
heads than ours, and I find the language there used the same as that proposed
. .. "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." What does that mean?
It means that when a charge is made against any person, he may demand that
the government shall bring the witnesses before his face, and that they shall
there, in his presence and under his eye, make the charge against him.
. [T] he provision that he shall be confronted with the witnesses against
him, compels the government to bring the witnesses bodily into the presence
of the accused.
Id. (quoting Debates and Proceedingsof the ConstitutionalConvention 102-03 (1857) (Republican Convention)). Justice Kelley also found significant that state courts were not required to undertake a Federal Confrontation Clause analysis until 1965, when the Sixth
Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Id. The justice acknowledged that the history
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have elected to followJustice Kelley's dissent to expand the right
of confrontation under the Minnesota Constitution and impose
32 1
tighter restriction on the use of out-of-court testimony.
Subsequent to Roberts, the Supreme Court held in United States
v. Inad3 22 that the unavailability of a witness is not necessarily a
prerequisite to the admission of hearsay statements in a criminal
case. 23 The Inadi Court recognized an exception to the general
and origins of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause have importance to the
analysis of Minnesota's confrontation clause, noting that the drafters of the Minnesota
bill of rights used much of the language of the Sixth Amendment to structure Minnesota's confrontation clause. However, he found that Minnesota cases prior to Pointer
independently demonstrated a preference for literal face-to-face confrontation and disapproval of hearsay testimony. Lanam II, 459 N.W.2d at 666 (citing State v. Hunter, 131
Minn. 252, 256, 154 N.W. 1083, 1084-85 (1915) for the proposition that the right to
actually face witnesses "is necessary to the protection of litigants and the orderly administration of the law upon the basis of truth, as disclosed by the testimony of living witnesses, and from first rather than second hand evidence"); State v. Allison, 175 Minn.
218, 222, 220 N.W. 563, 565 (1928) (noting that a conviction based on hearsay evidence
violated the defendant's right of confrontation and warranted reversal); State v. Hines,
270 Minn. 30, 41-42, 133 N.W.2d 371, 379 (1964) (confirming the proposition that
Minnesota recognizes the right of confrontation under the Minnesota Constitution);
State v. Shotley, 305 Minn 384, 386-87, 233 N.W.2d 755, 758 (1975) (noting that denial
of the state constitutional right of confrontation "is almost never harmless error"). Finally, Justice Kelley argued that even in light of Pointer,Minnesota maintained its strong
preference that an accusing witness present evidence in court, not by hearsay, in recognition of the fundamental nature of the state constitutional right of confrontation.
Lanam I, 459 N.W.2d at 666 (citing State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 102-03 (Minn.
1981)).
321. Other states, with constitutional confrontation provisions textually identical to
Minnesota's, have also adopted the two-prong Federal Confrontation Clause analysis for
their state provisions. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 209 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 923 (1989) (finding that Florida Statutes follow the general approach of Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)); State v. Deanes, 374 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989) (following the two-prong test in Ohio v. Roberts); State
v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981) (finding the two-prong test to be a "correct
and reasonable" standard); State v. Sprague, 479 A.2d 128, 131 (Vt. 1984) (identifying
the exception to the confrontation requirement); Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 415
(Wyo. 1985) (finding that former testimony is admissible under the confrontation
clause of Wyoming based on the two-prong test).
Other states with "face-to-face" language in their state confrontation clauses have
afforded no greater protection than that afforded under the federal test. See, e.g., State
v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694, 704-05 (Or. 1985) (applying the two-prong test); State v.
McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 163 (S.D. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (applying the
two-prong test); State v. Causby, 706 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tenn. 1986) (applying the twoprong test); State v. Burns, 332 N.W.2d 757, 763-64 (Wis. 1983) (finding that preliminary hearing testimony is not prohibited under the federal or Wisconsin constitutions
based on application of the two-prong test).
322. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.7 (1980) (indicating that " [a] demonstration of unavailability ... is not always required").
323. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
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unavailability requirement by admitting statements of nontestifying, available co-conspirators that were made in the course of a
conspiracy. 2 4 The Court indicated that the unavailability rule
was developed in cases that involved admission of former testimony. 5 Such cases warrant a preference for live testimony unless the witness is shown to be unavailable. 3 26 "[F] ormer
testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony...
[and] seldom has independent evidentiary significance of its
own. "327

The same reasoning is inapplicable to extrajudicial statements
that derive much of their significance from the non-trial context
in which they are made.3 2 8 The Court further rejected an unavailability requirement because it would impose a significant
practical burden on the prosecution to produce the declarants
when it was clear neither the prosecutor nor the defense wished
to examine the declarants at trial. 3 29 The Supreme Court has
affirmed Inadi to make an unavailability analysis a necessary part
of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only with respect to former
testimony.3 3 °
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Larson, 3 1 followed
Inadi to hold that statements of child victims are admissible even
if the nontestifying child is available.3 32 The court, however,
adopted a rule based on state evidentiary law rather than on constitutional law to require that the prosecution must call the child
if the defense so requests. 3 33 On remand, the Larson IP 34 majority upheld the conviction because the hearsay testimony bore
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under the factors
324. Id. at 394-95.
325. Id. at 394.
326. Id. at 394-95.
327. Id.
328. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395-96.
329. According to the Court:
Any marginal protection to the defendant by forcing the government to call as
witnesses those co-conspirator declarants who are available, willing to testify,
hostile to the defense, and yet not already subpoenaed by the prosecution,
when the defendant himself can call and cross-examine such declarants, cannot support an unavailability rule. We hold today that the Confrontation
Clause does not embody such a rule.
Id. at 399-400.
330. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 736, 741 (1992).
331. 453 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1990) [hereinafter Larson 1].
332. Id. at 45-46.
333. Id. at 46.
334. State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 1991) [hereinafter Larson I].
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enumerated in Lanam II and Wright... 5 The majority, nonethe33 6
less, concluded that the Inadi unavailability reasoning applied
and that a contrary interpretation was "at odds with that advanced by leading commentators."3 3 7
In State v. Scott,3 38 the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a

confrontation clause challenge to the admission into evidence of
an audiotape interview of a nontestifying child sex abuse witness.
The court, following Wright, applied the confrontation clause
rule to admit hearsay at trial only if there are adequate indicia of
reliability and if cross-examination would be of marginal utility. 339 The trial court was determined to have erroneously admitted the audiotape into evidence because the audiotape was not
sufficiently reliable to "overcome the presumption that cross-ex34 °
amination of the declarant would be useful."
In the other broad category of right of confrontation cases,
those involving a defendant's right to face and cross examine
adverse witnesses appearing at trial, the Supreme Court has held
335. Id. at 125 (citing Lanam II, 459 N.W.2d at 661; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,
817-21 (1990)).
336. Id. at 123 n.I. The Larson II court stated that "it is not at all clear that it was in
the interest of the defendant that the declarant be called by either side." Id. (quoting
Larson I, 453 N.W.2d at 45-46).
337. Id. at 124 n.1.
338. 501 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1993).
339. The court stated:
Whatever factors are deemed relevant to a trial court when determining
whether hearsay is reliable, we believe that this determination must always be
made against the background of the general concerns expressed by the
Supreme Court in Wright. Looking at the totality of the circumstances and all
of the factors bearing on reliability, the trial court must arrive at the conclusion that cross-examination would be fruitless as to the hearsay testimony in
question.
Id. at 618 (using the factors set out in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-21 (1990)).
340. Id. at 619. The court concluded that cross examination of the declarant would
have been more valuable than in Lanam. The Court noted that:
In this case, the initial statement was in response to a sexual abuse allegation
against her father ....
In this case, unlike Lanam, there has not been a consistent repeating of the same story. Additionally, in this case, the ... questions
were asked in a suggestive and sometimes leading way. Further, although the
judge found that [the declarant] did not have a motive to fabricate, there was
little evidence about whether [she] had a motive to fabricate; it seems worth
noting that the state bears the burden of proving reliability. The absence of a
motive to fabricate standing alone does not mean that a statement is reliable.
Of additional importance, in Lanam, the allegations of sexual abuse were
more lurid than they were in this case.... A 3-year old would not be expected
to be familiar with [such activities or language] in the absence of abuse. In this
case, no allegations have been made in language one would not expect a nineyear-old to know.
Id. at 618.
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that, based on individualized findings, a testifying witness will not
have to face the defendant. In Maryland v. Craig4 1 and Coy v.
Iowa,3 4 2 the Court considered the constitutionality of in-court
procedures that allowed a testifying child witness to avoid facing
the defendant charged with sexually assaulting the child.
In Coy, the Court vacated a conviction that resulted from a
trial where a child witness testified from behind a screen because
"the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to343
face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."
The Court hinted that it might make an exception to the face-toface confrontation clause requirement based on particularized
findings and where necessary to further an important public policy. 34 4 The Court concluded that such a showing had not been
made in the instant case.3 45 The CraigCourt upheld the admissibility of a child's testimony, seen in the courtroom by closedcircuit television, after the trial court determined that the use of
the procedure was necessary to prevent psychological harm to
the child from testifying in the defendant's presence.3 4 6
In State v. Conklin,3 47 the Minnesota Supreme Court decided a
confrontation clause challenge similar to Coy. The case specifically considered the circumstances under which a defendant in a
child sexual abuse case can be removed from the room during
the testimony of the alleged child-abuse victim without violating
the defendant's constitutional right to confront the testifying
witnesses.3 48 As authorized by statute, the child witness's testimony was taken and videotaped for use at trial. 349 After the vide341. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
342. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
343. Id. at 1016 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730,
748, 749-50 (1987)). With respect to the use of the screen, the Court indicated that "[i]t
is difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant's right to
a face-to-face encounter." Id. at 1020. In reaching its conclusion the Court observed:
"[F]ace to face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused
child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the
child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have
costs." Id.
344. Id. at 1021.
345. Id. at 1020-21.
346. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 836 (1990). The Court expressly confirmed
Coy in finding that the right of confrontation will only yield to an individualized showing that the defendant's presence during testimony causes the child witness trauma. Id.
(citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20, 1025-32).
347. 444 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989).
348. Id. at 269.
349. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 4(c) (1992). The statute provides:
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otaping was commenced, the court granted the state's motion to
remove the defendant from the room and the defendant viewed
the remainder of the testimony through a one-way video monitor located in another room.3 5 °
Adopting Coy, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that
the Minnesota statute for child witness protection was constitutional on its face because it required an individualized finding
that the defendant's presence during testimony would psychologically traumatize the witness.3 5 1 However, the court found
that the defendant's right to actual face-to-face confrontation
under both the Minnesota and Federal Constitutions was violated. 352 The trial court had failed to properly apply Coy and
determine, prior to removing the defendant, that the defendant's presence caused the testifying child witness psychological
trauma.3 53 The Conklin court held that the violation of the deThe court shall permit the defendant in a criminal or delinquency matter to
observe and hear the testimony of the child in person. If the court, upon its
own motion or the motion of any party, finds in a hearing conducted outside
the presence of the jury, that the presence of the defendant during testimony
taken pursuant to this subdivision would psychologically traumatize the witness so as to render the witness unavailable to testify, the court may order that
the testimony be taken in a manner that:
(1) the defendant can see and hear the testimony of the child in person
and communicate with counsel, but the child cannot see or hear the defendant; or (2) the defendant can see and hear the testimony of the child
by video or television monitor from a separate room and communicate
with counsel, but the child cannot see or hear the defendant.
Id.
350. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d at 270.
351. Id. at 272-73. The Court observed that MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 4(c) (1988)
established a permissible exception to the face-to-face confrontation clause requirement because it furthered the important public policy of protecting child witnesses
under 10 years of age based on an individualized finding of necessity. Conklin, 444
N.W.2d at 272.
352. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d at 274.
353. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that:
[I]n every case it must be established by specific evidence that the particular
witness is or would be psychologically traumatized and that traumatization is
substantially caused by the presence of the defendant rather than by other
reasons. The evidence of psychological traumatization "must show more than
mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify."
Id. (quoting Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1129 (Md. 1989)).
The court found the absence of such a finding in this case troubling because the
child had testified that she was not afraid of the defendant. Id. The court also found it
persuasive that other state courts, in addition to Craig, have applied Coy in the same
manner. Id. (citing State v. Vincent, 768 P.2d 150, 160-61 (Ariz. 1989); People v.
Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) cert. granted (Colo. 1989); State v.
Eastham, 530 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ohio 1988)).
Indeed, numerous additional state court decisions have adopted the Coy requirement that actual face-to-face confrontation yield only to case-specific evidence establish-
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fendant's right of confrontation was not harmless error.3 5 4 The
supreme court gave no indication that a separate confrontation
clause analysis was required under the Minnesota Constitution.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Minnesota judiciary, like its counterparts in other states,
has recognized and availed itself of the power it has to shape
constitutional law in directions away from national norms. This
recognition, however, is counterbalanced by a reluctance to
break from familiar federal constitutional standards, especially
the standards that are well-written and persuasive.
In examining six rights to the criminally accused protected
under the Minnesota constitution, which are nearly identical to
rights provided under the United States Constitution, no clear
pattern emerges on the extent to which Minnesota courts are
willing to interpret the state constitution more broadly. What is
clear, however, is that the Minnesota Constitution will continue
to be an important source of individual rights for litigants in the
years to come.
ing the necessity of protecting a child witness from testifying in the defendant's
presence. See, e.g., Blume v. State, 797 P.2d 664, 673 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Bonello, 554 A.2d 277, 281 (Conn. 1989); State v. Chisholm, 777 P.2d 753, 757 (Kan.
1989); State v. Davidson, 764 S.W.2d 731, 733-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); In re B.F., 553
A.2d 40, 42 (N.J. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Altgilbers, 786 P.2d 680, 687-88 (N.M. Ct. App.
1989); State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 451-53 (R.I. 1989).
Subsequent to Conklin, the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided a similar case in
State v. Ross, 451 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 837 (1990).
The court upheld use of a two-way video procedure under MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 4
(1988) to obtain the child witness' testimony. The court indicated that "[t]he confrontation clause and the statute itself require a 'particularized finding' that a procedure
shielding the child from face-to-face confrontation is necessary to prevent traumatization." Ross, 451 N.W.2d at 235 (citing Conklin, 444 N.W.2d at 272; Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1021 (1988)). The court of appeals held that the trial court had made the requisite finding. Id. at 235.
354. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d at 275. The Minnesota Supreme Court followed Coy to
apply the harmless error rule to the violation of the defendant's right of confrontation.
Id. The Conklin court found that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the removal of the defendant during testimony did not contribute to the conviction. Id. The court rejected speculating about what weight the jury would give to the
out-of-court statements of the witness and whether such evidence would have independently resulted in the defendant's conviction. Id.
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